On The Epistemic Effects of Envy in Academia

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Abstract

Envy is pervasive in academia. What are its epistemic effects? I present a characterization of envy that captures some of its essential features according to the philosophical literature. I use this characterization to illustrate a classic argument that views envy as collectively disadvantageous. Then, based on insights from the social epistemology of science, I evaluate this argument in the context of academic research. I argue that given the nature of epistemic goods, the best strategies available to the envious academic typically lead to collective epistemic benefits. I conclude by presenting a challenge for the design of epistemic institutions: it is difficult to restructure institutions to reduce envy without severe epistemic drawbacks.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Moral Psychology of Envy
EditorsSara Protasi
Place of PublicationLanham
PublisherRowman and Littlefield
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-5381-6007-7
ISBN (Print)978-1-5381-6006-0
Publication statusPublished - Aug-2022

Publication series

NameMoral Psychology of the Emotions

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