Optimal Defensive Resource Allocation for a Centrality-Based Security Game on Multi-Hop Networks

James R. Riehl, Ming Cao

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We present a new analysis of multi-hop network security in the form of a zero-sum game played between an attacker who tries to disrupt a network by disabling one or more nodes, and the nodes of the network who must allocate limited resources in defense of the network. The payoffs in the zero-sum game can be one of several performance metrics that correspond to node centrality measures. In the case of single-node attacks, we use a monotonicity property of the mixed attack strategies to construct a simple and very fast algorithm to compute saddle-point equilibrium strategies for both single-node and multiple-node defense. For simultaneous multiple-node attacks on large networks, the computational complexity becomes quite high, so we present a method to approximate the equilibrium strategies based on a sequential simplification, which performs well in simulations.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
PublisherIEEE (The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)
Number of pages6262
Publication statusPublished - 16-Dec-2015
Event2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on Decision and Control - Osaka, Japan
Duration: 15-Dec-201518-Dec-2015


Conference2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on Decision and Control

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