Précis of Unbelievable Errors

Bart Streumer*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This Précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of my explanation of our inability to believe the theory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257-269
Number of pages13
JournalInternational journal for the study of skepticism
Volume8
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec-2018

Keywords

  • error theory
  • non-reductive realism
  • reductive realism
  • non-cognitivism
  • belief

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