Problems with the life of pleasure: The γϵν ϵσiζ argument in plato's philebus (53c4-55a12)

At Philebus 53c4-55a12, Plato's Socrates identifies pleasure as an ontologically inferior "becoming" (γϵνϵσiσ) rather than a "being" (ouσiα) and then uses this information to infer that pleasure, somehow, lacks value. This paper argues that Plato's γϵνϵσiσ argument is not about the goodness of individual, particular episodes of pleasure but instead targets the identification of pleasure as the good around which we ought to organize our lives. It also shows that the argument is made up of two subarguments-the argument from finality and the argument from a life not worth living-both of which conclude that, as a γϵνϵσiσ, pleasure cannot be the good our life as a whole is aimed at reaching. Read in this way, the much maligned γϵνϵσiσ argument turns out to be more cogent and more interesting than is usually thought.