Abstract
Raub and Weesie (1990) proposed a game theoretical model addressingeffects of network embeddedness on conditional cooperation between two actors.This work showed that network embeddedness can facilitate conditional coopera-tion by reducing uncertainty, in line with a number of follow-up contributions andconsistently with results from other modelling approaches. This research focusedmainly on interactions between two parties embedded in a network. In the presentpaper, I extend a closely related model towardsN-person collective good problems,combining conditional cooperation based on direct monitoring via network ties andobservation of group output in an uncertain environment. The focus is on a maxi-mally simple yet empirically relevant case, a core-periphery network in which onlycore-members can directly observe each other’s contributions to a collective effort,whereas peripheral members only observe a noisy signal indicating aggregated con-tributions. I propose the possibility of a‘rational exploitation of the core by the pe-riphery’. Strategy-profiles in which free-riding of peripheral members is toleratedwhile core-members cooperate conditionally, are not only individually rational butalso payoff-superior to profiles with universal conditional cooperation if uncer-tainty is sufficiently high and the number of peripheral members is sufficiently low.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Advances in the Sociology of Trust and Cooperation |
Subtitle of host publication | Theory, Experiments, and Field Studies |
Editors | Vincent Buskens, Rense Corten, Chris Snijders |
Publisher | De Gruyter |
Chapter | 5 |
Pages | 91-112 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783110647495 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783110647013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct-2020 |