Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power

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Abstract

We consider a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest with uncertain discriminatory power in the contest success function. We examine the cases where both players are either informed or uninformed about the size of the discriminatory power, as well as the case where only one player has private information about it. We show that in all three cases the contest has a unique (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. In each case we characterize key properties of the equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)103-114
Number of pages12
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume56
Early online date23-Aug-2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan-2019

Keywords

  • CONTESTS
  • INFORMATION
  • DISSIPATION
  • SEEKERS
  • NUMBER

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