Self-fulfilling testimonial injustice

This paper introduces the concept of self-fulfilling testimonial injustice: a distinctive form of epistemic injustice whereby credibility deficits become true by shaping the very conditions that sustain them. Much of the literature on testimonial injustice has rightly emphasized cases in which credibility deficits are rooted in false beliefs, themselves underwritten by ethically bad affective investments. Yet such a focus risks obscuring a structurally significant variant: namely, those credibility deficits that are rendered true through self-fulfilling mechanisms. Drawing on insights from economics and psychology, I distinguish between motivated cognition-based and cognitive bias-based testimonial injustice, which together furnish the background conditions under which self-fulfilling testimonial injustice can take hold. I develop this account by drawing on both theoretical and experimental work on labor market discrimination, which illuminates the ways in which credibility deficits may become self-fulfillingly entrenched. Finally, I explore the distinctive harms of this form of injustice, focusing on its corrosive effects on epistemic self-confidence or self-trust and epistemic self-esteem, and suggest that its insidiousness and relative invisibility render it both difficult to detect and potentially more pervasive than has hitherto been acknowledged.