Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

Corijn van Mazijk*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
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Abstract

This paper discusses Husserl's theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that - in contrast with intentionalism - intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism's exclusive concern with propositional content.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)499-517
Number of pages19
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume47
Issue number4
Early online date17-Nov-2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Husserl
  • intentionality
  • intentionalism
  • representationalism
  • consciousness
  • non-representational content
  • non-propositional content
  • NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT
  • EXPERIENCE
  • TRANSPARENCY
  • EXTERNALISM
  • REPRESENTATIONALISM
  • PHENOMENOLOGY
  • INEXISTENCE
  • INTERNALISM
  • PERCEPTION
  • NOEMA

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