Stable interconnection of continuous-time price-bidding mechanisms with power network dynamics

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We study price-based bidding mechanisms in power networks fo r real-time dispatch and frequency regulation. On the market side, we consider the interaction between the independent system operator (ISO) and a group of generators involved in a Bertrand game of competition. The generators seek to maximize their individual profit while the ISO aims to solve the economic dispatch problem and to regulate the frequency. Since the generators are strategic and do not share their cost functions, the ISO engages the generators in a continuous-time price-based bidding process. This results in a coupling between the ISO-generator dynamics and swing dynamics of the network. We analyze its stability, establishing frequency regulation and the convergence to the efficient Nash equilibrium and the optimal generation levels. Simulation illustrate our results.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication20th Power Systems Computation Conference, PSCC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-910963-10-4
ISBN (Print)978-1-5386-1583-6
Publication statusPublished - 20-Aug-2018
Event20th Power Systems Computation Conference, PSCC 2018 - Dublin, Ireland
Duration: 11-Jun-201815-Jun-2018


Conference20th Power Systems Computation Conference, PSCC 2018


  • Bertrand competition
  • Economic dispatch
  • Electricity markets
  • Lyapunov stability
  • Power system dynamics

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