Abstract
In this paper we focus on the way in which courts affect public policy. We present a model of judicial behavior that combines insights from theories emphasizing the importance of policy preferences with those suggesting that courts are only motivated by formal-legal criteria. By embedding our model of judicial choice in a broader context of political decision-making we show how judges are able to affect policy and under what circumstances the judiciary will change their legal interpretations. The model is applied to decision-making by the Dutch Supreme Court on euthanasia to illustrate its main features.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 305-323 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Theoretical Politics |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - Jul-2000 |
Keywords
- court decision making
- euthanasia
- game theory
- judicial behavior
- public policy
- BUREAUCRACY
- DECISIONS
- POLITICS
- POLICY
- STATE