The role of emotions in the maintenance of cooperative behaviors

Chunyan Zhang*, Jianlei Zhang, Franz J. Weissing

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Our attention is focused on how individual emotions influence collective behaviors, which captures an aspect of reality missing from past studies: free riders may suffer some stress, which could adapt jointly with the individual stress intensity and size of the gaming group. With an evolutionary game theoretical approach, we gain the fixation probability for one mutant cooperator to invade and dominate the whole defecting population. When the stress intensity exceeds a threshold, natural selection favors cooperators replacing defectors in a finite population. We further infer that lower stress intensity is sufficient for one mutant cooperator to become fixed with an advantageous probability in a larger population. Moreover, when the gaming group is smaller than the population size, the more the return from the public goods, the lower the threshold of stress intensity required to facilitate the full dominance of cooperators. We hope our studies may show that individual sentiments or psychological activities will open up novel explanations for the puzzle of collective actions. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2014

Original languageEnglish
Article number18007
Number of pages6
JournalEurophysics Letters
Volume106
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr-2014

Keywords

  • PUBLIC-GOODS GAMES
  • INDIRECT RECIPROCITY
  • ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT
  • EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
  • STRATEGIES
  • EMERGENCE
  • PROMOTES
  • POPULATIONS
  • REPUTATION
  • DIVERSITY

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