Abstract
In this paper, I clarify some central aspects of Stoic thought concerning identity, identification, and so-called peculiar qualities (qualities which were seemingly meant to ground an individual’s identity and enable identification). I offer a precise account of Stoic theses concerning the identity and discernibility of individuals and carefully examine the evidence concerning the function and nature of peculiar qualities. I argue that the leading proposal concerning the nature of peculiar qualities, put forward by Eric Lewis, faces a number of objections, and offer two constructive suggestions which turn upon reconsidering the nature and function(s) of peculiar qualities. Finally, I examine a simple but potent Academic argument against the view that identification requires detecting some attribute(s) unique to the relevant individual. Such an argument is, I argue, largely successful and may have encouraged later Stoics not to think that peculiar qualities enable identification.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 113-159 |
Number of pages | 47 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Stoics
- Identity
- Identification
- Metaphysics
- Academics