Total Evidence, Uncertainty and A Priori Beliefs

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

Defining the rational belief state of an agent in terms of her initial or a priori belief state as well as her total evidence can help to address a number of important philosophical problems. In this paper, I discuss how this strategy can be applied to cases in which evidence is uncertain. I argue that taking evidence to be uncertain allows us to uniquely determine an agent’s subjective a priori belief state from her present beliefs and her total evidence. However, this also undermines a common assumption on the independence evidence.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNew Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science
EditorsLaura Felline, Antonio Ledda, Francesco Paoli, Emanuele Rossanese
PublisherCollege Publications
Pages57-66
ISBN (Print)978-1-84890-160-5
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

NameThe SILFS series
Volume3

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