Unintended Consequences of Central Bank Lending in Financial Crises

Christiaan van der Kwaak*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

I investigate the macroeconomic impact of central bank funding becoming a more attractive funding source to financial intermediaries in times of crisis. I show that the requirement to pledge collateral has a contractionary effect on private credit everything else equal, and thereby reduces the expansionary effect that such lending otherwise has. I use an estimated New-Keynesian model with financial frictions to show that the collateral effect explains the limited growth of Italian banks’ private credit in response to the ECB’s three-year LTROs. Finally, I explore whether changes in lending policy can offset the cumulative negative effects from the collateral effect.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)728–765
Number of pages38
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume134
Issue number658
Early online date21-Sept-2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb-2024

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