Abstract
Although the critique of reification is a core commitment of critical theories, there is no widely accepted account of its normative foundation. In Lukács’s original analysis, this foundation is provided by a strong concept of practice which is, however, not acceptable from a contemporary point of view. I argue that the systematic character of reification theory can only be upheld if this concept is replaced by a more intersubjective notion of normative practices. Reification can then be analysed as a second-order pathology of social practices, as an inhibition of reflexivity by their normative shape. The normative justification of such critique, however, turns out to be more context-dependent than it is usually imagined.
Translated title of the contribution | Reification as a Second-Order Pathology |
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Original language | German |
Pages (from-to) | 731-746 |
Journal | Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie |
Volume | 59 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 4-Nov-2011 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- reification
- second-order pathology
- social pathology
- Georg Lukács