What determines the strength of practical and cognitive presumptions?

Petar Bodlovic*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademic

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    This paper investigates the relationship between practical and cognitive presumptions. It argues that two types of presumptions come with different conceptions of strength. While the strength of a practical presumption is supposed to be correlated with the weight of rebuttal, the strength of a cognitive presumption is correlated with the degree of a proposition’s plausibility. However, the degree of plausibility is not necessarily correlated with the weight of the burden of rebuttal.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
    EditorsBart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, Jean H.M. Wagemans
    Place of PublicationAmsterdam
    PublisherRozenberg/ Sic Sat
    Number of pages11
    ISBN (Print)9789090316369
    Publication statusPublished - 15-Mar-2019
    EventThe 9th ISSA Conference on Argumentation - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    Duration: 3-Jul-20186-Jul-2018


    ConferenceThe 9th ISSA Conference on Argumentation


    • burden of proof
    • cognitive presumption
    • instrumental rationality
    • John Pollock
    • Nicholas Rescher
    • plausibility
    • presumption
    • strength
    • undercutting defeater

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