Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between practical and cognitive presumptions. It argues that two types of presumptions come with different conceptions of strength. While the strength of a practical presumption is supposed to be correlated with the weight of rebuttal, the strength of a cognitive presumption is correlated with the degree of a proposition’s plausibility. However, the degree of plausibility is not necessarily correlated with the weight of the burden of rebuttal.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation |
| Editors | Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, Jean H.M. Wagemans |
| Place of Publication | Amsterdam |
| Publisher | Rozenberg/ Sic Sat |
| Pages | 106-116 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9789090316369 |
| Publication status | Published - 15-Mar-2019 |
| Event | The 9th ISSA Conference on Argumentation - Amsterdam, Netherlands Duration: 3-Jul-2018 → 6-Jul-2018 |
Conference
| Conference | The 9th ISSA Conference on Argumentation |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Netherlands |
| City | Amsterdam |
| Period | 03/07/2018 → 06/07/2018 |
Keywords
- burden of proof
- cognitive presumption
- instrumental rationality
- John Pollock
- Nicholas Rescher
- plausibility
- presumption
- strength
- undercutting defeater