When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?

A.J.M. Peijnenburg*, David Atkinson

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    25 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in science than in philosophy.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)305-322
    Number of pages18
    JournalJournal for General Philosophy of Science
    Volume2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2003

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