Abstract
This dissertation is about disagreement. More specifically, it is about disagreement between peers, that is, agents that are relevantly similar, such as equally competent scientists, jurists, doctors, or philosophers. More specifically still, this thesis is about a certain epistemological theory, called the conciliatory view, according to which rational disagreement between peers is impossible.
The dissertation investigates the extent to which the conciliatory view is viable, and what additional assumptions that are required for this. The investigation focuses on three variables: the kinds of disagreement that peers can have, the exact definition of peerhood, and how rationality is further understood. The outcome of the investigation is that the conciliatory view is viable only in specific cases of disagreement, between epistemically completely similar peers, under a restrictive notion of rationality.
The dissertation investigates the extent to which the conciliatory view is viable, and what additional assumptions that are required for this. The investigation focuses on three variables: the kinds of disagreement that peers can have, the exact definition of peerhood, and how rationality is further understood. The outcome of the investigation is that the conciliatory view is viable only in specific cases of disagreement, between epistemically completely similar peers, under a restrictive notion of rationality.
| Original language | English |
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| Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
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| Award date | 7-Dec-2017 |
| Place of Publication | [Groningen] |
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| Print ISBNs | 978-94-034-0260-4 |
| Electronic ISBNs | 978-94-034-0261-1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |