Why formal objections to the error theory fail

Bart Streumer*, Daniel Wodak*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)
53 Downloads (Pure)


Many philosophers argue that the error theory should be rejected because it is incompatible with standard deontic logic and semantics. We argue that such formal objections to the theory fail. Our discussion has two upshots. First, it increases the dialectical weight that must be borne by objections to the error theory that target its content rather than its form. Second, it shows that standard deontic logic and semantics should be revised.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)254-262
Number of pages9
JournalAnalysis (United Kingdom)
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1-Apr-2021


  • duality
  • error theory
  • excluded middle
  • permissibility

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