Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good

Kritika Maheshwari*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/Letter to the editorAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
83 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-252
Number of pages4
JournalEthics, Policy and Environment
Volume25
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Keywords

  • climate change
  • duties
  • John Broome
  • offsetting
  • risk

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