Why Is Behavioral Game Theory a Game for Economists? The Concept of Beliefs in Equilibrium

Michiru Nagatsu , Chiara Lisciandra

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists’ specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists’ reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists’ practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationA Genealogy of Self-Interest in Economics
    EditorsSusumu Egashira, Masanori Taishido, D. Wade Hands, Uskali Mäki
    Place of PublicationSingapore
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages289-308
    Number of pages20
    ISBN (Electronic)978-981-15-9395-6
    ISBN (Print)978-981-15-9394-9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2021

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