Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either

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Abstract

Jonas Olson writes that “a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity”. I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. In this symposium contribution, I first argue that Olson should say that reasons for belief are irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then explain why I think Olson's objections to this argument fail. I end by showing that Olson cannot defend his view as a partly revisionary alternative to an error theory about all irreducible normativity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)419-436
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Volume13
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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