Abstract
The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant-neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. When we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. This chapter proposes a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. The analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | About Oneself |
Subtitle of host publication | De Se Thought and Communication |
Editors | Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 9 |
Pages | 220-245 |
Number of pages | 26 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191781711 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198713265 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1-Feb-2016 |