Description
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. There is ample evidence that human cooperative behaviour towards other individuals is often conditioned on information about previous interactions. This information derives both from personal experience (direct reciprocity) and from experience of others (i.e. reputation; indirect reciprocity). Direct and indirect reciprocity have been studied separately, but humans often have access to both types of information. Here, I focus on two aspects that promote our understanding of cooperation by reciprocity. First, in many mathematical models reputation is considered as binary, being either good or bad. Intuitively, however, reputation feels more gradual and indeed some models and experiments address this intuition. It intuitively makes sense as well that individuals seldom become bad after one bad action and that it may take “bad” individuals some time to gain a good reputation. Using game-theoretic models I will show that allowing for gradation of reputations results in evolution of assessment rules that conform to this intuition. It appears advantageous to judge acts of possible cooperation in such a way that individuals have a high probability to become bad and a low probability to become good: Reputation “comes on foot and leaves on horseback”. Second, using game-theoretic experiments on indirect reciprocity I will argue that the current model frameworks fail to explain the diversity in consistent strategies human subjects display. Hence, future theoretical work should no longer focus on finding stable “ESS-type” strategies but on elucidating how coexistence of various strategies may maintain cooperation.| Periode | 8-mei-2024 |
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| Evenementstitel | Dutch Society for Theoretical Biology (NVTB) Annual Meeting 2024 |
| Evenementstype | Conference |
| Locatie | Schoorl, NetherlandsToon op kaart |
| Mate van erkenning | National |