A case of confusing probability and confirmation

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Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)101-107
Aantal pagina's7
TijdschriftSynthese
Volume184
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
DOI's
StatusPublished - jan-2012
EvenementConference on Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies - , Belgium
Duur: 1-apr-2008 → …

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