A delegated agent in a winner-take-all contest

L. Schoonbeek

doi:10.1080/13504850110049333

A delegated agent in a winner-take-all contest

L. Schoonbeek^*

^*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Onderzoeksoutput › Academic › peer review

Samenvatting

A standard winner-takes-all rent-seeking contest with a principal-agent relationship is extended. One of the two players offers a contract to an agent to act as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen. The equilibrium of the extended contest is characterized.

Originele taal-2	English
Pagina's (van-tot)	21-23
Aantal pagina's	3
Tijdschrift	Applied Economics Letters
Volume	9
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1080/13504850110049333
Status	Published - 2002

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