Samenvatting
We consider a winner-take-all contest extended with a principal-agent re-lationship.
One of the two players, say player 1, offers a contract to an agent to act in
the contest as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately
chosen by player 1. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this contest and com-pare
its properties with those of the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding standard
contest in which both players compete themselves. We show that the expected utility
of player 1 is larger in the contest with a delegate if he is strongly risk averse with
respect to his money income and moreover the contested prize is large enough.
| Originele taal-2 | English |
|---|---|
| Uitgever | s.n. |
| Aantal pagina's | 15 |
| Status | Published - 1999 |