A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Yuri David Santos*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

1 Downloads (Pure)

Samenvatting

Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information (or evidence), which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available information or evidence, which is the object of the agents' knowledge, can be seen as a database. By adopting this sceptical posture in our semantics, we prepare the ground for logics where the notion of knowledge-or more appropriately, belief-is entirely based on evidence. The technical results include a set of reduction axioms for public announcements, correspondence proofs, and a complete tableau system. In summary, our contributions are twofold: on the one hand we present an intuition and possible application for many-valued modal logics, and on the other hand we develop a logic that models the dynamics of evidence in a simple and intuitively clear fashion.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)451-489
Aantal pagina's39
TijdschriftJournal of Logic, Language and Information
Volume29
Nummer van het tijdschrift4
Vroegere onlinedatum10-feb-2020
DOI's
StatusPublished - 2020

Citeer dit