A prospect-theory model of voter turnout

Oliver Herrmann*, Richard Jong A Pin, Lambert Schoonbeek

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

7 Citaten (Scopus)
30 Downloads (Pure)


We incorporate prospect-theory preferences in a game-theoretic model to study voter turnout. We show that voter turnout is heavily affected by agents having subjective reference points with respect to the vote or abstain decision and their subjective probability weighting in the decision-making process. Using empirically based parameter values, we show that our model has lower prediction error than other game-theoretic models with standard expected-utility preferences. We also find that our model maintains desirable comparative statics effects and leads to higher turnout predictions in larger electorates.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)362-373
Aantal pagina's12
TijdschriftJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
StatusPublished - dec.-2019

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