Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information

L. Schoonbeek; B.M. Winkel

doi:10.1007/s11127-006-7974-y

Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information

L. Schoonbeek, B.M. Winkel

Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Onderzoeksoutput › Academic › peer review

14 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

We consider a rent-seeking contest in which one player has private information about his own valuation of the prize. This valuation may be either high or low. All other players have a known and identical valuation of the prize. We present necessary and sufficient conditions under which the privately informed player exerts a positive or zero equilibrium effort.

Originele taal-2	English
Pagina's (van-tot)	123-132
Aantal pagina's	10
Tijdschrift	Public Choice
Volume	127
Nummer van het tijdschrift	1-2
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-7974-y
Status	Published - apr.-2006

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Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
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