Akrasia as a character trait

Paulien Juliana Snellen

Akrasia as a character trait

Paulien Juliana Snellen

Ethiek, Sociale en Politieke Filosofie

Onderzoeksoutput

1136 Downloads (Pure)

Samenvatting

Stel, je bent van oordeel dat je het beste zuinig met water kunt omgaan, maar toch blijf je telkens weer langer onder de douche staan dan je zelf goed vindt. Dan handel je akratisch, dat wil zeggen, tegen je eigen oordeel in. In de filosofie genereert akrasia twee problemen. Hedendaagse filosofen benaderen akrasia vooral als logische puzzel. Hoe kan iemand op het moment van handelen het ene vinden en toch het andere doen? In de klassieke oudheid en middeleeuwen zagen filosofen akrasia echter vooral als moreel probleem. Ze beschouwden akrasia bijvoorbeeld als een karaktertrek die iemand verhindert om een goed leven te leiden. Ik claim dat het ook in hedendaagse filosofische discussies vruchtbaar is om akrasia als karaktertrek op te vatten.

De hedendaagse literatuur over akrasia richt zich vrijwel alleen maar op de logische puzzel hoe een singuliere en geïsoleerde akratische handeling mogelijk is. Dit proefschrift is bewust niet bedoeld als een bijdrage om deze logische puzzel op te lossen. Hoewel het een interessant filosofisch probleem is, laat het ook een belangrijk aspect buiten beschouwing: het is namelijk mogelijk en zelfs typisch voor mensen om herhaaldelijk tegen hun eigen oordeel in te handelen. In dit proefschrift concentreer ik me daarom op akrasia als een karaktertrek. Voortbordurend op het werk van Aristoteles laat ik zien dat het heel waardevol is om akrasia als karaktertrek te beschouwen, omdat we op die manier recht kunnen doen aan de repetitieve aard en morele status van akrasia. Dit sluit aan bij alledaagse ervaringen van akrasia.

Originele taal-2	English
Kwalificatie	Doctor of Philosophy
Toekennende instantie	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Begeleider(s)/adviseur	Kleingeld, Pauline, Supervisor Peijnenburg, Jeanne, Supervisor
Datum van toekenning	19-mrt.-2018
Plaats van publicatie	[Groningen]
Uitgever	University of Groningen
Gedrukte ISBN's	978-94-034-0401-1
Elektronische ISBN's	978-94-034-0400-4
Status	Published - 2018

Toegang tot document

Complete thesisFinal publisher's version, 1,54 MB
PropositionsFinal publisher's version, 460 KB

Handle.net

Permanente koppeling

Citeer dit

@phdthesis{ec6d27decc074a79935433bdd81e5533,

title = "Akrasia as a character trait",

abstract = "Say you judge it is best not too spill too much water, yet you keep taking longer showers than you hold best. In that case you act akratically, that is, you act against your better judgment. In philosophy, akrasia raises two problems. Contemporary philosophers approach akrasia mainly as a logical puzzle. How can someone at the moment of action judge it best to act in a certain way, but act otherwise? Ancient and medieval philosophers primarily approached akrasia as a moral problem. They considered it, for example, a character trait that prevents someone from leading a good life. I claim that it is fruitful to regard akrasia as a character trait in contemporary philosophical discussions as well. The contemporary literature on akrasia is almost exclusively preoccupied with the logical puzzle of how a single and isolated akratic action is possible. This dissertation is deliberately not meant as a contribution to solving this logical puzzle. Although it is an interesting philosophical problem, it fails to address a very significant issue: people can, and typically do, act against their better judgment repeatedly. In this dissertation, I therefore focus on akrasia as a character trait. Building on the work of Aristotle, I show that it is very much worthwhile to approach akrasia as a character trait, because a character approach captures the repetitive nature and moral status of akrasia. This does justice to akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday life.",

author = "Snellen, {Paulien Juliana}",

year = "2018",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-94-034-0401-1",

publisher = "University of Groningen",

school = "University of Groningen",

}

TY - BOOK

T1 - Akrasia as a character trait

AU - Snellen, Paulien Juliana

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Say you judge it is best not too spill too much water, yet you keep taking longer showers than you hold best. In that case you act akratically, that is, you act against your better judgment. In philosophy, akrasia raises two problems. Contemporary philosophers approach akrasia mainly as a logical puzzle. How can someone at the moment of action judge it best to act in a certain way, but act otherwise? Ancient and medieval philosophers primarily approached akrasia as a moral problem. They considered it, for example, a character trait that prevents someone from leading a good life. I claim that it is fruitful to regard akrasia as a character trait in contemporary philosophical discussions as well. The contemporary literature on akrasia is almost exclusively preoccupied with the logical puzzle of how a single and isolated akratic action is possible. This dissertation is deliberately not meant as a contribution to solving this logical puzzle. Although it is an interesting philosophical problem, it fails to address a very significant issue: people can, and typically do, act against their better judgment repeatedly. In this dissertation, I therefore focus on akrasia as a character trait. Building on the work of Aristotle, I show that it is very much worthwhile to approach akrasia as a character trait, because a character approach captures the repetitive nature and moral status of akrasia. This does justice to akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday life.

AB - Say you judge it is best not too spill too much water, yet you keep taking longer showers than you hold best. In that case you act akratically, that is, you act against your better judgment. In philosophy, akrasia raises two problems. Contemporary philosophers approach akrasia mainly as a logical puzzle. How can someone at the moment of action judge it best to act in a certain way, but act otherwise? Ancient and medieval philosophers primarily approached akrasia as a moral problem. They considered it, for example, a character trait that prevents someone from leading a good life. I claim that it is fruitful to regard akrasia as a character trait in contemporary philosophical discussions as well. The contemporary literature on akrasia is almost exclusively preoccupied with the logical puzzle of how a single and isolated akratic action is possible. This dissertation is deliberately not meant as a contribution to solving this logical puzzle. Although it is an interesting philosophical problem, it fails to address a very significant issue: people can, and typically do, act against their better judgment repeatedly. In this dissertation, I therefore focus on akrasia as a character trait. Building on the work of Aristotle, I show that it is very much worthwhile to approach akrasia as a character trait, because a character approach captures the repetitive nature and moral status of akrasia. This does justice to akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday life.

M3 - Thesis fully internal (DIV)

SN - 978-94-034-0401-1

PB - University of Groningen

CY - [Groningen]

ER -

Akrasia as a character trait

Samenvatting

Toegang tot document

Handle.net

Vingerafdruk

Citeer dit