Are People Implicitly Moral Objectivists?

Lieuwe Zijlstra*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

3 Citaten (Scopus)
130 Downloads (Pure)


In this paper I argue that there are at least two ways in which people can be moral objectivists, namely implicitly and explicitly. It is possible to explicitly deny being a moral objectivist while being implicitly committed to it. Enoch (2014) presents three thought experiments to convince his reader that they are moral objectivists even if they explicitly think otherwise. As it happens, Enoch’s tests, which he uses as intuition pumps, provide excellent measures of implicit metaethical commitments. In this paper I use each of them as material for survey experiments to test whether people are implicit moral objectivists. Overall, results provide support for the idea that people are moral objectivists.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)229–247
Aantal pagina's19
TijdschriftReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
Vroegere onlinedatum20-nov.-2021
StatusPublished - mrt.-2023

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