This article contributes to the growing Article 7 TEU literature by showcasing the strong and weak points of this provision in the context of the on-going rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland threatening the very fabric of EU constitutionalism. This is done by presenting the general context of the institutional reactions to the so-called ‘reforms’ in Poland and Hungary aimed to hijack the state machinery by the political parties in charge; introducing the background of Article 7 TEU and the hopes of the drafters the provision was endowed with; to move on to the analysis of its scope and all the procedures made available through this instrument as well as the key procedural rules in place. The conclusion restates the necessity of putting our hopes in alternative instruments of combatting rule of law backsliding, outlining three possible scenatios of this, which are not (necessarily) connected to Article 7 as such.
|Tijdschrift||Polish Yearbook of International Law|
|Status||Published - 2018|