Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection

Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Robert Lensink*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

1 Citaat (Scopus)

Samenvatting

This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)185-187
Aantal pagina's3
TijdschriftEconomics Letters
Volume124
Nummer van het tijdschrift2
DOI's
StatusPublished - aug-2014

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