Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest

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6 Citaten (Scopus)
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Samenvatting

We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)153-158
Aantal pagina's6
TijdschriftPublic Choice
Volume139
Nummer van het tijdschrift1-2
DOI's
StatusPublished - apr.-2009

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