Samenvatting
This paper argues that Margaret Cavendish is a metaphysical deflationist about life. That is, it claims that, in Cavendish's mature philosophy, life is no metaphysical kind. From this it also follows that claims about matter being alive play no role in Cavendish's (natural) philosophy. On my reading, living is identical with (natural) being, Cavendish has no problem of life, and the label of vitalism is explanatorily vacuous as applied to her philosophy.
Originele taal-2 | English |
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Pagina's (van-tot) | 697–715 |
Aantal pagina's | 19 |
Tijdschrift | Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science |
Volume | 77 |
Nummer van het tijdschrift | 4 |
Vroegere onlinedatum | 31-mei-2023 |
DOI's | |
Status | Published - 1-nov.-2023 |