Clarke's Rejection of Superadded Gravity in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence

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    In the past, experts have disagreed about whether Samuel Clarke accepted the idea that gravity is a power superadded to matter by God. Most scholars now agree that Clarke did not support superaddition. But the argumentation employed by Clarke to reject superaddition has not been studied before in detail. In this paper, I explicate Clarke's argumentation by relating it to an important discussion about the possibility of superadded gravity in the Clarke-Collins correspondence. I examine Clarke's responses to Collins and draw on his other works to reconstruct Clarke's reasons for rejecting superadded gravity.
    Originele taal-2English
    Pagina's (van-tot)237-255
    Aantal pagina's19
    TijdschriftHistory of Philosophy Quarterly
    Nummer van het tijdschrift3
    StatusPublished - 1-jul-2019

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