Confirmation based on analogical inference: Bayes meets Jeffrey

Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla*, Alexander Gebharter

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

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Certain hypotheses cannot be directly confirmed for theoretical, practical, or moral reasons. For some of these hypotheses, however, there might be a workaround: confirmation based on analogical reasoning. In this paper we take up Dardashti, Hartmann, Thébault, and Winsberg’s (2019) idea of analyzing confirmation based on analogical inference Bayesian style. We identify three types of confirmation by analogy and show that Dardashti et al.’s approach can cover two of them. We then highlight possible problems with their model as a general approach to analogical inference and argue that these problems can be avoided by supplementing Bayesian update with Jeffrey conditionalization.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)174-194
Aantal pagina's21
TijdschriftCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Nummer van het tijdschrift2
Vroegere onlinedatum20-nov-2019
StatusPublished - feb-2020

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