Consensus in opinion dynamics as a repeated game

Dario Bauso*, Mark Cannon

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

16 Citaten (Scopus)
15 Downloads (Pure)

Samenvatting

We study an n-agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in multi-population opinion dynamics with macroscopic and microscopic intertwined dynamics. The averaging process describes the influence from neighbouring populations, whereas the input term indicates how the distribution of opinions in the population changes as a result of dynamical evolutions at a microscopic level (individuals' changing opinions). The input term is obtained as the vector payoff of a two player repeated game. We study conditions under which the agents achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set. Such conditions build upon the approachability principle in repeated games with vector payoffs. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)204-211
Aantal pagina's8
TijdschriftAutomatica
Volume90
DOI's
StatusPublished - apr-2018
Extern gepubliceerdJa

Citeer dit