Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

Lambert Schoonbeek*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

    OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

    6 Citaten (Scopus)


    We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize.

    Originele taal-2English
    Pagina's (van-tot)453-464
    Aantal pagina's12
    TijdschriftPublic Choice
    Nummer van het tijdschrift3-4
    StatusPublished - jun.-2007

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