Samenvatting
To foster competition, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate, or by imposing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and imposing divestitures of such stations on the four major companies. We evaluate this policy experiment and find that the auctioning of licenses without an obligation to divest has no discernible effect on prices. An obligation to divest lowers prices by 1.3-2.3% at divested sites. Moreover, prices decrease by 0.9-1.2% at sites nearby. This suggests that the observed price decreases are at least partly due to competitive spillovers.
Originele taal-2 | English |
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Pagina's (van-tot) | 467-502 |
Aantal pagina's | 36 |
Tijdschrift | Journal of Industrial Economics |
Volume | 62 |
Nummer van het tijdschrift | 3 |
DOI's | |
Status | Published - sep.-2014 |
Vingerafdruk
Duik in de onderzoeksthema's van 'Do Auctions and Forced Divestitures Increase Competition? Evidence for Retail Gasoline Markets'. Samen vormen ze een unieke vingerafdruk.Datasets
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Retail gasoline prices in the Netherlands 2005 - 2011
Heijnen, P. (Creator) & Soetevent, A. (Contributor), DANS - Data Archiving and Networking Services, 1-jun.-2016
Dataset