Do Auctions and Forced Divestitures Increase Competition? Evidence for Retail Gasoline Markets

Adriaan R. Soetevent*, Marco A. Haan, Pim Heijnen

*Corresponding author voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

8 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

To foster competition, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate, or by imposing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and imposing divestitures of such stations on the four major companies. We evaluate this policy experiment and find that the auctioning of licenses without an obligation to divest has no discernible effect on prices. An obligation to divest lowers prices by 1.3-2.3% at divested sites. Moreover, prices decrease by 0.9-1.2% at sites nearby. This suggests that the observed price decreases are at least partly due to competitive spillovers.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)467-502
Aantal pagina's36
TijdschriftJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume62
Nummer van het tijdschrift3
DOI's
StatusPublished - sep.-2014

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