Do great apes switch perspectives? Husserl, Tomasello, and operative intentionality

In Becoming Human (2021), evolutionary psychologist Michael Tomasello provides a comprehensive account of the social intentionality which makes us human. One of the many themes discussed is the intentionality required for switching between perspectives. A number of interesting claims are made in these parts, including that great apes (and young infants) have no sense of perspective, no understanding of false beliefs, and do not know they could be wrong about how they experience things. While I am sympathetic to the general purport of Tomasello’s theory of switching perspectives, I believe his theory mispresents the intentional skills that are involved in various pre-conceptual forms of switching perspectives, to the extent that it is worth a brief commentary. I first outline Tomasello’s theory of perspectivalness, and subsequently develop an alternative, based on the phenomenological distinction between operative and thematic intentionality.