Embedded cognition and mental causation: setting empirical bounds on metaphysics

Fred Keijzer*, Maurice Schouten

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

15 Citaten (Scopus)
1115 Downloads (Pure)


In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim's version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers' notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim's key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)109-125
Aantal pagina's17
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
StatusPublished - sep-2007

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