ICS Utrecht University Abstract The paper discusses a laboratory experiment in which pairs of trustors play finitely repeated Trust Games with the same trustee. We study trustfulness of the trustors as well as trustworthiness of the trustee. We distinguish between learning and control effects on trustfulness and trustworthiness. Learning ef-fects are related to an actor’s information on past behavior of the partner. Con-trol effects are related to opportunities for sanctioning a trustee in future inter-actions. The experiment includes two conditions that represent different types of “embeddedness” of Trust Games. In one condition, each trustor only knows what happens in her own games with the trustee. In the other condition, each trustor also knows what happens in the games of another trustor with the trus-tee. Thus, with respect to trustfulness of the trustor, the design allows for disen-tangling learning effects from own experience of the trustor with the trustee and learning effects through third-party information, i.e., information on experi-ences of the other trustor with the trustee. Also, the design allows for disentan-gling control effects on trustfulness and on trustworthiness through own sanc-tion opportunities of the trustor and through opportunities for third-party sanctions, i.e., sanctions implemented by the other trustor.
|Titel||Proceedings of the First International Conference on Reputation: Theory and Technology - ICORE 09|
|Redacteuren||Mario (Ed.) Paolucci|
|Status||Published - 2009|
|Evenement||First International Conference on Reputation: Theory and Technology ICORE 09 - |
Duur: 1-jan-2009 → 1-dec-2009
|Conference||First International Conference on Reputation: Theory and Technology ICORE 09|
|Periode||01/01/2009 → 01/12/2009|