Free will as a higher-level phenomenon?

Alexander Gebharter*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

2 Citaten (Scopus)
28 Downloads (Pure)

Samenvatting

List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List's approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)177-187
Aantal pagina's11
TijdschriftThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volume9
Nummer van het tijdschrift3
Vroegere onlinedatum18-aug-2020
DOI's
StatusPublished - sep-2020

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