The literature regarding the effect of power on negotiation strategies remains scattered and inconsistent. We propose that the effect of power on negotiation strategies is contingent on contextual variables but also on individual differences among negotiators. Specifically, we hypothesize that creativity moderates the effect of power such that low-power, as compared to high-power negotiators, use more collaborative and less competitive strategies and further report lower fixed-pie perception (i.e., perception of a counterpart’s goals and interests as diametrically opposite to one’s own goals and interests) when they can be creative. Moreover, we hypothesize that negotiators’ age buffers the moderated effect of power. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 played a negotiation game in dyads. Study 1 manipulated power as status, whereas Study 2 as Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (i.e., power to exit the negotiation without a deal). Study 3 (preregistered) was a field study. Across the three studies we found support for most of our hypotheses. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.