How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

Katinka J. P. Quintelier; Lieuwe Zijlstra

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

Katinka J. P. Quintelier, Lieuwe Zijlstra

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We argue in favor of a reinterpretation of the invocations of Moore's naturalistic fallacy and Hume's is/ought problem with regard to statements in articles in contemporary cognitive science. Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary is/ought statements in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.

Originele taal-2	English
Artikelnummer	503
Aantal pagina's	3
Tijdschrift	Frontiers in Psychology
Volume	5
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503
Status	Published - mei-2014
Extern gepubliceerd	Ja

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10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503Licentie: CC BY

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciencesFinal publisher's version, 312 KBLicentie: CC BY

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