How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

Katinka J. P. Quintelier, Lieuwe Zijlstra

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

2 Citaten (Scopus)
71 Downloads (Pure)


We argue in favor of a reinterpretation of the invocations of Moore's naturalistic fallacy and Hume's is/ought problem with regard to statements in articles in contemporary cognitive science. Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary is/ought statements in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.
Originele taal-2English
Aantal pagina's3
TijdschriftFrontiers in Psychology
StatusPublished - mei-2014
Extern gepubliceerdJa

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