Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?

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In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)55-67
Aantal pagina's13
TijdschriftPhilosophical Explorations
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
StatusPublished - 2009

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