Impermissible Self‑Rationalizing Pessimism: In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief

Nikolaj Nottelmann*, Boudewijn de Bruin

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

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Samenvatting

We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)257-274
Aantal pagina's18
TijdschriftErkenntnis
Volume86
Vroegere onlinedatum4-apr-2019
DOI's
StatusPublished - 2021

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