In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno

Igor Douven; Christoph Kelp

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x

In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno

Igor Douven^*, Christoph Kelp

^*Corresponding author voor dit werk

Onderzoeksoutput: Article › Academic › peer review

2 Citaten (Scopus)

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A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.

Originele taal-2	English
Pagina's (van-tot)	289-297
Aantal pagina's	9
Tijdschrift	Dialectica
Volume	66
Nummer van het tijdschrift	2
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x
Status	Published - jun.-2012

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abstract = "A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.",

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KW - KNOWLEDGE

KW - EXPLANATION

KW - INFERENCE

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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno

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